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children	are,	by	their	constitution,	fond	of	brilliant	colors,	and	of	regular	figures…’.53	Reid	makes	a	distinction	between	this	instinctive	sense	or	judgment	of	beauty	and	a	more	developed	one,	which	he	calls	a	‘rational’	judgment	of	beauty.	In	rational	judgments	we	are	able	to	identify	relevant	qualities	and	provide	reasons	or	an	explanation	for	our	judgment.	The	quality	of	the	object	is	‘distinctly	conceived,	and	may	be	specified’:					 The	beauties	of	the	field,	of	the	forest,	and	of	the	flower-garden,	strike	a	child		 long	before	he	can	reason.	He	is	delighted	with	what	he	sees;	but	he	knows		 not	why.	This	is	instinct,	but	it	is	not	confined	to	childhood;	it	continues		 through	all	the	stages	of	life.	It	leads	the	florist,	the	botanist,	the	philosopher,		 to	examine	and	compare	the	objects	which	Nature,	by	this	powerful	instinct,		 recommends	to	his	attention.	By	degrees,	he	becomes	a	critic	in	beauties	of		 this	kind,	and	can	give	a	reason	why	he	prefers	one	to	another.	In	every		 species,	he	sees	the	greatest	beauty	in	the		plants	or	flowers	that	are	most		 perfect	in	their	kind	—	which	have	neither	suffered	from	unkindly	soil		 nor	inclement	weather;	which	have	not	been	robbed	of	their	nourishment	by		 other	plants,	nor	hurt	by	any	accident.54		
																																																								53	Ibid.,	598.	Reid	may	have	been	making	an	implicit	reference	to	Hutcheson’s	remark	that	children	tend	to	like	‘simpler’	and	‘regular’	figures	(Inquiry,	30).	
54	EIP,	607.	
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It	is	important	to	understand	that	this	is	the	only	sense	in	which	he	thinks	that	aesthetic	judgments	are	‘rational’.	Reasoning	is	not	the	basis	of	aesthetic	experience	and	we	do	not	arrive	at	aesthetic	judgments	through	reasoning,	say,	as	if	we	could	deduce	beauty	in	some	way	from	a	set	of	qualities	in	objects.	The	sense	in	which	experience	of	beauty	is	rational	tracks	his	common	sense	idea	that	perception	includes	belief.	Knowledge	will	play	some	role,	certainly,	and	more	so	than	we	see	in	Hutcheson’s	account.55	The	appreciator	with	more	experience	of	some	aesthetic	object	will	potentially	experience	greater	beauty,	able	to	grasp	why	the	object	has	aesthetic	value	and	able	to	make	comparisons	to	other	beauties.			 On	first	glance,	it	might	seem	that	appreciators	lacking	experience	and	knowledge	have	shallow	experiences	of	beauty,	but	I	do	not	think	this	is	what	Reid	means	to	say.56	Reid,	like	Hutcheson,	sketches	a	democratic	picture	of	the	capacity	to	experience	beauty	–	from	the	experience	of	the	child,	to	an	adult	lacking	experience	of	something,	to	an	adult	who	has	acquired	more	understanding	through	greater	experience	of	the	aesthetic	object	or	through	specialist	knowledge.	It	is	noteworthy	that	his	list	of	experienced	appreciators	of	flower-gardens	does	not	privilege	scientific	knowledge	over	other	ways	in	which	we	might	develop	the	capacity	to	make	rational	judgments	of	beauty.	The	florist	and	the	botanist	are	on	equal	footing:	the	florist,	with	extensive	sensory	experience	of	flowers	and	formal	
																																																								55	Cf.	Kivy,	The	Seventh	Sense,	158-168.	I	would	argue	against	an	interpretation	of	Reid’s	theory	as	a	type	of	‘rationalist	aesthetics’	(or,	even,	without	qualification,	‘empiricist	aesthetics’).	It	is	a	distinctive	aesthetic	theory,	strongly	shaped	by	his	complex	epistemology.	
56	Cf.	Copenhaver,	‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	Perception’.	
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arrangements	of	them;	and	the	botantist,	with	their	specialised	scientific	knowledge	of	plants.	We	have	also	seen	that	the	sense	of	instinctive	beauty	extends	to	non-humans	animals.57		 In	addition,	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	the	instinctive	judgment	of	beauty	is	a	kind	of	aesthetic	judgment	in	its	own	right.	It	is	a	judgment	of	aesthetic	merit,	where	beauty	strikes	us,	even	if	we	cannot	pin	it	down	to	particular	qualities.	The	passages	quoted	above	provide	evidence	of	the	child’s	capacity	to	experience	beauty	in	this	way,	perceiving	aesthetic	qualities	and	experiencing	pleasure.	So,	while	greater	beauty	might	follow	with	more	experience,	this	does	not	seem	to	diminish	the	
quality	of	these	experiences	and	the	judgments	that	we	make.	They	are	not	necessarily	superficial,	being	only	of	a	different	kind.	Reid	holds	that	instinctive	judgments	cannot	be	true	or	false,	the	standard	of	taste	which	he	holds	for	rational	judgments,	because	if	we	cannot	pin	down	the	qualities	which	strike	us	as	beautiful,	it	will	be	more	difficult	to	provide	an	explanation	for	our	judgment.			 In	light	of	these	points,	we	find	that	Reid’s	distinction	not	only	identifies	but	is	also	able	to	capture	the	broad	range	of	our	aesthetic	responses	to	nature,	from	being	struck	by	we	know	not	what	to	responses	with	a	greater	degree	of	attention,	repeated	experiences,	or	where	background	knowledge	and	experience	fill	out	appreciation.	We	also	find	that	he	values	the	genesis	of	taste	across	our	lives,	from	childhood	to	adulthood,	as	it	develops	and	expands.	The	mature	taste	of	an	adult,	traced	through	empirical	experience	by	Reid,	rather	than	development	of	the	mind	
																																																								57	Hutcheson	also	alludes	to	this;	see	Inquiry,	28.	
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exclusively,	is	more	valuable,	but	he	also	observes	that	‘each	is	beautiful	in	its	season.’58			 The	broadness	in	Reid’s	account	also	reflects	an	interesting	pluralism	in	his	grasp	of	natural	beauty.	Like	Hutcheson,	he	provides	an	inventory	of	beauties,	but	two	points	of	contrast	are	immediately	apparent.	First,	Reid’s	inventory	is	less	systematic,	and	while	it	moves	through	the	natural	world,	from	inanimate	matter	to	plants	to	animals,	and	finally,	to	human	beauty,	he	does	not	really	treat	each	class	of	things	as	carefully	as	Hutcheson.	Second,	Reid	does	not	privilege	mathematical	theorems	as	a	class	of	beauty.	I	surmise	that	this	is	because	he	objects	to	the	reduction	of	beauty	to	one	source	or	common	quality,	as	we	see	found	in	‘uniformity	amidst	variety’.	He	argues:	‘Beauty	is	found	in	things	so	various,	and	so	very	different	in	nature,	that	it	is	difficult	to	say	wherein	it	consists,	or	what	there	can	be	common	to	all	objects	in	which	it	is	found….What	can	it	be	that	is	common	to	the	thought	of	a	mind,	and	the	form	of	a	piece	of	matter,	to	an	abstract	theorem,	and	a	strike	of	wit?	I	am	indeed	unable	to	conceive	any	quality	in	all	the	different	things	that	are	called	beautiful,	that	is	the	same	in	them	all’.59	Without	the	emphasis	on	mathematical	theorems	and	the	discussion	of	astronomical	phenomena,	order	and	harmony	are	mainly	limited	to	his	own	discussion	of	the	planets	and	the	universe,	and	otherwise	do	not	feature	strongly	in	his	theory.	The	upshot	is	a	more	pluralistic	
																																																								58	EIP,	614.	
59	EIP,	591;	see	also	EIP,	575;	and	Costelloe,	The	British	Aesthetic	Tradition,	30.	
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approach	to	natural	beauty	that	is	closer,	I	believe,	to	the	actual	range	of	natural	beauties	many	of	us	experience.60	I	shall	return	to	this	point	below.		 A	potential	stumbling	block	for	Reid’s	views	about	natural	beauty	arises	from	his	wider	philosophical	ideas	as	well	as	his	deism.	Unlike	Hutcheson,	Reid	draws	a	distinction	between	‘original’	and	‘derived’	beauty.	Original	beauty	is	found	in	qualities	of	mind,	while	‘objects	of	sense’	have	derived	beauty,	which	is	‘derived	from	some	relation	they	bear	to	mind,	as	the	signs	or	expressions	of	some	amiable	mental	quality,	or	as	the	effects	of	design,	art,	and	wise	contrivance.’61	Human	beings	have	original	beauty	(e.g.,	in	the	virtues),	and	works	of	art,	as	the	products	of	human	minds,	have	derived	beauty.62	Where	does	this	leave	natural	beauty	that	is	not	human	beauty?	This	is	where	Reid’s	deism	comes	to	the	fore.	Natural	beauties	will	exhibit	divine	mental	qualities	and	their	beauty	will	be	expressive	of	such	qualities.63	The	question	arises,	however,	as	to	whether	or	not	nature’s	derived	beauty	is	therefore	reduced	to	divine	beauty,	and	not	something	appreciated	in	its	own	right.	
																																																								60	This	wide-ranging	picture	of	beauty	need	not	collapse	into	relativism	because,	on	Reid’s	account,	we	nevertheless	perceive	excellences	as	objective	qualities;	see	Gallie’s	defence	of	Hutcheson	on	this	point	in,	Thomas	Reid,	148-149.	
61	EIP,	601.	
62	Reid	also	points	to	human	beings	as	the	greatest	kind	of	natural	beauty;	see	EIP,	608.		
63	Zuckert	shows	that	the	derived	beauty	of	plants	and	animals	is	also	expressive	of	mind	for	Reid,	in	the	sense	that	they	express	signs	of	flourishing	(‘Thomas	Reid’s	Expressivist	Aesthetics’).	Here,	we	see	mental	qualities	which	appear	to	be	reflected	across	human	and	non-human	life.	
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	 That	natural	beauty	is	reduced	to	divine	beauty	would	not	do	justice,	I	believe,	to	the	ways	in	which	Reid’s	aesthetic	theory	moves	on	from	Shaftesbury’s,	especially	in	light	of	Reid’s	familiarity	with	subsequent	theories	of	taste	and	beauty,	as	well	as	own	interest	in	natural	history	and	Newtonian	science.	A	more	charitable	interpretation,	supported	by	Reid’s	remarks	quoted	earlier,	would	be	that	nature	is	appreciated	as	beautiful	for	both	its	own	qualities	and	its	qualities	of	mind	as	derived	from	God.	That	is,	those	qualities,	even	if	indicators	of	and	originating	in	the	divine,	will	still	have	the	objective	qualities	that	make	something	beautiful,	such	as	a	particular	configuration	of	colours	and	forms.64			 	
Hutcheson,	Reid,	and	Contemporary	Debates	in	Aesthetics	of	Nature	and	
Environmental	Aesthetics		Perhaps	the	most	central	question	motivating	new	work	in	aesthetics	and	nature	and	environmental	aesthetics	is:	What	are	the	grounds	of	appropriate	aesthetic	judgments	of	nature?	One	way	that	appropriateness	is	construed	in	this	context	is	in	terms	of	appreciating	nature	as	nature	as	opposed	to,	say,	appreciating	nature	as	if	it	were	a	work	of	art.	With	works	of	art,	artistic	considerations	such	as	style	and																																																									64	Gallie	makes	a	similar,	though	rather	more	sophisticated,	argument	for	the	derived	beauty	of	objects	of	sense	(Thomas	Reid,	171-174).	Copenhaver	defends	Reid	against	claims	that	his	distinction	between	original	and	derived	beauty	commits	him	to	some	kind	of	subjectivism	(‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	Perception’,	136).	These	arguments,	as	well	as	Zuckert’s	(see	previous	note),	provide	additional	reasons	why	derived	natural	beauty	may	be	considered	independently	of	human	or	divine	mind	or	intentions.	
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intention	help	to	ground	and	guide	our	judgments	about	why	we	find	works	of	art	beautiful,	ugly	and	so	on.	With	respect	to	nature	and	environment,	this	kind	of	guidance	does	not	make	much	sense,	so	we	need	to	consider	where	such	guidance	might	come	from.	If	one	agrees	with	the	view	that	aesthetic	judgments	of	nature	are	more	indeterminate	than	judgments	of	art	–	somehow	more	free,	less	constrained	by,	for	example,	by	the	conventions	and	ways	of	the	artworld	–	this	issue	becomes	especially	important.	Environmental	aesthetics	has	sought	to	move	beyond	imposing	human	frameworks	on	nature,	humanising	nature,	where	one	such	framework	would	be	appreciating	nature	always	through	the	lens	of	art.	The	aesthetic	perspective	is	commonly	identified	with	culture,	in	so	far	as	we	are,	here,	talking	about	aesthetic	valuing	made	by	human	culture.	That	is,	aesthetic	judgment	is	anthropogenic.	However,	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	between	aesthetic	perspectives	and	values	which	are	more	and	less	anthropocentric.		 In	recent	debates,	answers	to	the	question	of	appropriate	appreciation	of	nature	divide	into	two	competing	approaches:	‘scientific	cognitivism’	and	‘non-cognitivism’.	Scientific	cognitivism	holds	that	if	our	aesthetic	valuing	of	nature	is	to	reach	beyond	a	superficial	response	and	to	be	appropriate	to	what	it	is	we	perceive,	that	valuing	must	be	informed	by	scientific	knowledge.	The	most	well	established	position,	Allen	Carlson’s	‘natural	environmental	model’	rests	on	an	argument	by	analogy.65	In	artistic	judgments,	art	history	and	criticism	provide	the	appropriate	foundation.	For	natural	aesthetics,	Carlson	finds	the	most	legitimate	and	‘objective’																																																									65	Allen	Carlson,	Aesthetics	and	the	Environment:	The	Appreciation	of	Nature,	Art	and	Architecture	(London	and	New	York,	2000).	
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source	in	the	natural	sciences.	It	is	claimed	that	such	knowledge	will	ensure	aesthetic	judgments	that	accord	with	their	objects,	enabling	a	grasp	of	relevant	aesthetic	qualities.	For	example,	if	I	were	to	appreciate	a	humpback	whale	under	the	category	of	‘fish’	rather	than	‘mammal’,	the	whale	may	appear	as	a	clumsy	fish	rather	than	a	majestic	mammal	moving	gracefully	through	the	ocean.		 Non-cognitivists	agree	that	we	need	to	avoid	aesthetic	valuing	that	distorts	or	humanises	nature,	but	they	argue	that	scientific	cognitivism	too	narrowly	characterises	what	is	appropriate	and	thereby	discounts	the	range	of	legitimate	ways	we	experience	the	natural	world,	for	example,	through	immersive,	environmental,	appreciation,	or	responses	which	are	open	to	the	place	of	imagination	and	emotion	as	layers	that	enhance	perception	and	increase	forms	of	attention	to	the	world.66			 Now,	it	seems	to	me	that	a	baseline	for	appropriate	appreciation	will	be	a	non-instrumental	approach,	that	is,	one	that	appreciates	the	object	for	what	it	is,	the	qualities	it	actually	possesses.	Yuriko	Saito	expresses	this	idea	as	appreciating	nature	‘on	its	own	terms’,	which	means	adopting	a	normative	aesthetic	approach:	‘…an	attitude	which	would	involve	listening	to	nature’s	own	story….recognizing		and	respecting	nature	as	having	its	own	reality	apart	from	our	presence’.67	It	is	in	articulating	this	normative	feature	of	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature	that	
																																																								66	For	a	representative	sample	of	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	approaches	in	environmental	aesthetics,	see,	Allen	Carlson	and	Arnold	Berleant,	ed.,	The	Aesthetics	of	Natural	Environments	(Peterborough,	2004).	
67	Yuriko	Saito,	‘Appreciating	Nature	on	Its	Own	Terms’,	Environmental	Ethics	20	(1998).		
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Hutcheson’s	theory	becomes	especially	significant,	in	so	far	as	disinterestedness	means	that	our	judgments	of	natural	beauty,	as	grounded	in	the	sense	of	beauty,	will	be	directed	at	natural	items,	processes	and	phenomena	themselves,	and	not	our	own	interests	or	desire	for	possession	or	appropriation.	On	his	account	(and	from	within	his	necessarily	more	anthropocentric	philosophical	and	historical	framework),	there	is	no	explicit	interest	in	grasping	nature’s	own	terms,	but	there	is	an	interest	in	theorizing	the	sense	of	beauty	as	independent	from	self-interest,	as	he	prepares	the	ground	for	his	case	for	the	moral	sense.	We	can	learn	from	his	approach	that	aesthetic	judgment	is	constrained	in	this	way,	and	as	such,	signifies	a	stance	that	will	resist	imposing	one’s	own	utilitarian	interests	–	human	interests	–	on	the	aesthetic	object.	Given	that	Reid	also	recognises	the	independence	of	beauty	from	utility,	his	ideas	are	consistent	with	such	an	approach.		 Our	own	human	ways	of	seeing	things	will	show	themselves	in	our	engagement	with	the	natural	world,	no	doubt,	and	we	may	never	be	able	to	grasp	what	nature’s	‘terms’,	in	fact,	are.	But	the	main	point	of	Saito’s	idea	is	that	we	ought	to	make	the	effort	if	we	are	truly	to	appreciate	nature	in	all	its	distinctiveness,	and	not	what	we	want	from	it	or	what	we	want	it	to	be.	This	does	not	mean	that	our	aesthetic	engagement	with	nature	must	be	totally	‘dehumanized’,	somehow	divorced	from	the	cultural	position	of	any	human	aesthetic	stance,	but	it	ought	not	be	overly	humanizing	either.	In	this	vein,	Hutcheson	recognizes	the	role	of	association	of	ideas,	and	with	respect	to	nature	this	takes	the	form	of	seeing	resemblances	between	nature	and	culture:	‘Thus	a	Tempest	at	Sea	is	often	an	
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Emblem	of	Wrath;	a	Plant	or	Tree	drooping	under	the	Rain,	of	a	Person	in	Sorrow’.68	However,	he	also	admonishes	the	way	some	associations	of	ideas	take	the	form	of	biases	which	prevent	proper	perception	of	beauty:	‘Thus	Swines,	Serpents	of	all	Kinds,	and	some	Insects	really	beautiful	enough,	are	beheld	with	Aversion	by	many	People,	who	have	got	some	accidental	Ideas	associated	to	them.’69	Reid	also	describes	expressiveness	in	nature	through	his	concept	of	natural	signs,	but	as	I	have	argued	earlier	in	the	paper,	his	account	is	not	reductive	and	recognises	the	excellences	that	underlie	beauty	of	nature	in	their	own	right.70		 The	independence	of	beauty	from	utility	and	knowledge	as	well	as	Hutcheson’s	categorising	of	the	natural	world	within	‘absolute’	beauty	makes	his	theory	of	beauty	a	good	fit	for	a	non-cognitive	approach.	That	knowledge	may	play	some	role	as	an	added	effect,	but	not	as	grounding	our	aesthetic	judgments,	is	also	present	in	both	Hutcheson’s	theory	and	non-cognitive	views.	Where	does	Reid’s	theory	fit	with	respect	to	contemporary	ideas	about	natural	beauty?		 Reid’s	distinction	between	instinctive	and	rational	beauty	is	especially	interesting	for	reflecting	on	this	question.	On	the	one	hand,	it	fits	with	cognitive	approaches	in	so	far	as	our	capacity	for	rational	beauty	means	that	when	we	gain	knowledge	and	experience	of,	say,	plants,	we	may	become	better	at	identifying	and	explaining	their	beauty.	But	unlike	Carlson,	Reid	does	not	appear	to	prioritise	the	experience	of	the	botanist	over	the	experience	of	the	florist,	which	also	has	more																																																									68	Inquiry,	44.		
69	Inquiry,	62.		
70	For	some	of	Reid’s	remarks	on	expressiveness	in	nature,	see	EIP,	590.	
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experience	(in	Reid’s	‘rational’	terms),	yet	not	from	science.	The	florist’s	experience	is	one	of	learning	how	to	formally	arrange	flowers	(based	largely	in	sensory	or	perceptual	experience)	and,	presumably,	developing	a	sense	for	what	colours	and	forms	work	best	to	create	appealing	arrangements.	For	Carlson,	the	botanist	would	always	make	the	most	appropriate	or	correct	judgments	because	they	have	knowledge	of	natural	history	and,	in	that	respect,	an	understanding	of	the	appropriate	appreciative	categories.		 In	this	way,	Reid’s	ideas	chime	nicely	with	theories	in	environmental	aesthetics	which	do	not	prioritise	perception	thickened	by	thought	elements	over	aesthetic	engagement	where	the	senses	are	more	prominent.	Ronald	Hepburn	explains	the	range	of	appropriate	appreciations	we	might	find	in	aesthetic	experience.	‘We	need	to	acknowledge	a	duality	in	much	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature,	a	sensuous	component	and	a	thought-component.	First,	sensuous	immediacy:	in	the	purest	cases	one	is	taken	aback	by,	for	instance,	a	sky	colour-effect,	or	by	the	rolling	away	of	cloud	and	mist	from	a	landscape.	Most	often,	however,	an	element	of	thought	is	present,	as	we	implicitly	compare	and	contrast	here	with	elsewhere,	actual	and	possible,	present	with	past.’71	Each	experience	is	appropriate	and	aesthetically	valuable	for	Hepburn,	opening	up	space	for	a	wide	range	of	appropriate	responses	and	different	aesthetic	frameworks.	Given	Reid’s	botanist	and	florist,	as	well	as	the	instinctive	beauty	perceived	by	a	child,	we	find	a	more	open	approach	to	natural	beauty	than	the	cognitivist	offers.		
																																																								71	Ronald	W.	Hepburn,	Reach	of	the	Aesthetic	(Aldershot	and	Burlington,	2001),	2.	
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	 Instinctive	beauty	maps	nicely,	too,	onto	Saito’s	own	approach,	which	sits	between	the	cognitive	and	non-cognitive,	supporting	the	role	of	science	but	challenging	its	centrality.	Her	views	embrace	a	range	of	appreciative	frameworks,	which	nonetheless	begin	and	end	in	the	sensuous	surface	of	natural	phenomena.			 Certainly,	the	philosophical	ideas	of	Hutcheson	and	Reid	are	products	of	their	time.	Although	we	do	see	an	interest	in	nature	where	the	three	‘kingdoms’	of	nature	–	animal,	plant,	and	mineral	–	are	recognized	in	their	own	right	as	worthy	of	aesthetic	consideration,	their	overall	perspective	remains	anthropocentric.	Yet,	we	also	find	that	their	theories	of	beauty,	as	well	as	their	empirical	examples	from	natural	history,	are	sensitive	to	natural	qualities	possessed	independently	of	human	utility.	Ultimately,	their	views	present	a	non-instrumental	valuing	of	natural	beauty	that	is	meaningful	in	its	own	time	and	significant	for	ours.				
